Every day, millions of people step onto Britain’s trains thinking about fares, delays and crowded carriages. But behind those journeys sits another financial system: the companies that own many of the trains themselves.
Newly published accounts have put that system under the spotlight. The chief executives of Britain’s three biggest rolling-stock companies—Porterbrook, Eversholt Rail and Angel Trains—received a combined £3.5 million in 2025, while the companies distributed roughly £391 million in dividends to shareholders.
The numbers have landed at a particularly significant moment. The government has just published its new rolling-stock and infrastructure strategy, opening the door to public ownership of new trains where ministers and Great British Railways conclude that buying rather than leasing offers better value for taxpayers and passengers.
Three companies, hundreds of millions in dividends
The figures tell three very different corporate stories.
Porterbrook distributed £80 million in dividends, while chief executive Mary Grant’s remuneration rose by more than 10% to £1.44 million.
Eversholt Rail paid £200 million to shareholders in 2025, shortly before its sale by CK Hutchison to Beacon Rail. Its departing chief executive, Mary Kenny, received £1.33 million.
Angel Trains distributed another £111 million, while chief executive Malcolm Brown received £700,000.
Together, those dividend payments approached £400 million.
The figures do not, by themselves, establish that the companies acted unlawfully or improperly. They do, however, expose the scale of money flowing through Britain’s train-leasing model at precisely the moment when the government is reconsidering whether that model should continue for future fleets.
The railway’s hidden middle layer
For more than three decades, most passenger trains have generally been owned by rolling-stock companies and leased to train operators. Under the government’s new strategy, Great British Railways will assess future trains on a case-by-case basis, considering public ownership, private leasing and other financing models.
The financial stakes are substantial.
According to the figures reported from the rail regulator, operators spent more than £4 billion leasing trains last year, while the rolling-stock sector recorded a net profit margin of 18.5%.
That is why the argument is no longer simply about who owns the trains.
It is about how Britain’s railway pays for them—and who ultimately benefits from that arrangement.
Unions want the government to go further
The RMT has seized on the figures to demand a levy on rolling-stock company profits.
The union says the three largest companies have distributed £2.4 billion in dividends over the past decade and argues that some of the money generated within the railway should instead help reduce passengers’ costs.
Its position is contested by the companies themselves.
Porterbrook says it has invested more than £1 billion since 2020 in new trains, fleet upgrades, technology and infrastructure, and says it is looking to invest another £1 billion. It also says its shareholders’ funding enables those investments.
Angel Trains likewise argues that future fleet decisions should focus on passenger outcomes while preserving the conditions needed to attract investment into Britain’s railway.
A bigger railway experiment is already underway
This debate is unfolding alongside a much broader restructuring of Britain’s railways.
Great British Railways is being developed as the future organisation responsible for bringing track and train together, while passenger services are progressively moving into public ownership. The government says GBR will ultimately provide a single coordinating structure for the railway.
The latest strategy therefore raises a fundamental question for the next generation of Britain’s trains:
Should the public continue paying private companies to own the trains—or should the railway eventually own the assets it depends upon?
The answer has not yet been settled. But with executive pay, hundreds of millions in dividends and billions spent leasing trains now visible in the same set of accounts, the economics of Britain’s railway are becoming impossible to ignore.
